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ABSTRACT: 
This chapter provides a critical exploration of the European Union’s impact on the UNGASS 2016 
proceedings and Outcome document.  It demonstrates that the ability to produce a European 
‘common position’ ahead of the UNGASS debates represents a significant step forward in the ability 
to ‘speak with one voice’ in the global illicit drug policy arena, and has played an important role in 
ensuring key issues such as human rights and public health remain on the agenda.  In highlights, 
however, a European failure to engage with issues such as the continuing suitability of the 
international drug conventions to preside over the current climate of drug policy innovation and 
experimentation, and the unintended consequences of a ‘war on drugs’ approach.  Ultimately, 
therefore, it argues that these failures will hamper the development of a more progressive and 
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The European Union (EU) regards the UNGASS 2016 Outcome document as a significant success, as 
evidenced by this extract from a recent speech made at the sixtieth session of the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs (CND) held in Vienna from 13-17 March, 2017: “The EU and its Member States would 
like to emphasise that the outcome of the General Assembly on the world drug problem held in 2016 
is a major step forward in our ability to tackle together the world drug problem” (European Union, 
2017a:1).  Furthermore, it is keen to emphasise the role that it played in the development of that 
Outcome document: “We appreciate the inclusion of several of our proposals in the Outcome 
document” (European Union, 2016:1).   Finally, recent internal (European Commission, 2017a; 
European Parliament, 2016) and external (RAND, 2017) evaluations of European drug policy, 
undertaken since the UNGASS 2016 meeting, have been quick to emphasise the significant internal 
success for the EU represented by the ability to reach a ‘common position’ (European Union, 2015) on 
UNGASS 2016; no mean feat in the contentious area of illegal drug policy on which the EU has often 
been described as divided (Boekhaut van Solinge, 1999; Tops, 2001; Chatwin, 2003).    
 
This chapter critically explores the common position put forward by the EU in preparation for UNGASS 
2016.  It acknowledges the significance of the EU’s ability to speak “with one strong voice” (Council of 
the European Union, 2012:7) in this area and suggests that the call for drug policies that are “built 
upon a sound public health approach, based on scientific evidence and supported by reliable and 
objective monitoring systems and evaluation, in compliance with human rights” (European Union, 
2015:2) represents an important step forward in terms of what Member States have previously been 
able to agree on.   An engagement with recent EU contributions to ongoing drug policy debates and 
preparations for the next UN High Level Ministerial drugs meeting in 2019 further suggests that the 
EU remains firmly committed to championing change in drug policy in line with the principles outlined 
above.  
 
While undeniably playing a role in ensuring key issues have made it onto the global drug policy agenda, 
the EU has, however, also played a significant role in defending the status quo by confirming their 
ongoing and unwavering support of the current system of international drug control encapsulated by 
the international drug and psychotropic substance conventions: “Finally, I would like to underline the 
position of the EU and its Member States that the three UN Drug Control Conventions and the 
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Universal Declaration on Human Rights are the framework of the global response to the world drug 
problem” (European Union, 2016:1).  This chapter, therefore, also explores the limitations of an 
approach that refuses to acknowledge the failures of existing drug policy or the lack of progress 
towards global targets to eradicate or significantly reduce drug use.  It concludes that the EU is 
beginning to take the stage as an important global voice on drug policy related matters, but that its 
capacity to advocate for change is somewhat hampered by its lack of engagement with the continuing 
suitability of existing systems of international drug control.   
 
The drive to ‘speak with one voice’ 
 
Drug policy is, inherently, an international issue and the EU has been active in this area since the late 
1980s.  Seeking to build on the United Nations’ success in gaining near global agreement to the 
prohibition of drugs, illicit drug policy was quickly earmarked as an area for ‘ever closer union’ within 
Europe. In the late 1980s and early 1990s when European social policy was in its infancy, the European 
Parliament organised two commissions charged with investigating the possibility of determining the 
most effective existing strands of European drug policy, with a view to engendering their 
implementation across Europe (Blom & van Mastrigt, 1994).  When both commissions failed to reach 
consensus on the most effective style of drug policy and, furthermore, noted that drug policy was an 
area entrenched in national culture, the principle of subsidiarity (Duff, 1993) was applied and policies 
designed to control illicit drugs were left in the hands of national governments. 
 
European level involvement in the control of illicit drugs, however, has remained strong.  This is partly 
evidenced by the significant number of groups and bodies created within the EU in this area including, 
for example, the Horizontal Drugs Group (HDG) which monitors and discusses all cross-pillar activities 
in the fields of drugs and the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) 
which collates and disseminates information on all aspects of the European drug situation  In addition, 
the EU has at regular intervals since 1990, published clear guiding principles in the development of 
drug policy within Europe via its European Drug Strategy and Action Plans.  Finally, more significant 
inroads into harmonisation of European drug policy have been made in several areas.  Framework 
Decisions have been ratified in two areas of drug policy making – the creation of minimum maximum 
penalties in serious drug trafficking offences (Council of the European Union, 2004a) and the sharing 
of information and control of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) (Council of the European Union, 
2005).  The other observable trend within European drug policy has been towards the principle of 
RUNNING HEADER: The EU in Panglossian stagnation   
 
harm reduction with every European Member State now offering a minimum level of needle exchange 
and substitution treatment programmes (Rhodes & Hedrich, 2010).  
 
Recent drug policy documents produced by the EU have increasingly emphasised the benefits of 
international cooperation and coordination.  The 2009-2012 European Drug Action Plan (Council of 
the European Union, 2008) included specific aims in this area: to adopt EU common positions on drugs 
in international fora; and to promote an EU approach to the illegal drug problem.  Further, the 2005-
2012 European Drug Strategy declared coordination “key to the establishment and conduct of a 
successful strategy against drugs (Council of the European Union, 2004b:8).  Continuing in this trend, 
the last European Drug Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2012:7) aims to “ensure that the EU 
speaks with one strong voice in international forums”. 
 
This ability to ‘speak with a single voice’ has proven difficult to achieve in practice.  “Drugs are a 
sensitive and highly political issue.  The debate is often polarized between a more enforcement-
oriented approach focusing on measures to combat trafficking and a more tolerant approach that 
focuses on prevention and reduction of drugs-induced health disorders.  The dichotomy is visible both 
within all the Member States and also between them” (Commission of the European Communities, 
2003:4).  Within Europe there are a variety of approaches to drugs – consider for example the contrast 
between the Netherlands where separation of the markets, normalisation of drug users and the 
application of harm reduction are highly evident policy strategies, and Sweden which operates a zero 
tolerance approach based on the aim of a drug-free society and which employs criminal sanctions 
against drug use and coercive treatment (Chatwin, 2011).  In attempting to speak for Europe on this 
issue, the EU must navigate a delicate line which takes care to be inclusive of all the national policies 
that fall within its borders. 
 
The creation of a European ‘common position’ on UNGASS 2016 thus represents somewhat of a 
success for the development of European drug policy.  Its contribution to global debates on the future 
of drug policy control prove that Europe can ‘speak with one voice’ and, within the EU, it has been 
lauded as a major step forward towards increased coordination in this area.  A recent mid-term 
evaluation of the current Drug Strategy and Action Plan (European Commission, 2017a:10) reported 
that “one key area in which the Strategy and Action Plan add value is enabling the EU to speak with 
one voice in international fora, as demonstrated in the run up to UNGASS 2016”.  An adjunct document 
further emphasises the success of the ‘common position’ as “the 2016 outcome document was largely 
coherent with the EU UNGASS position and the EU Strategy and Action Plan” (European Commission, 
RUNNING HEADER: The EU in Panglossian stagnation   
 
2017b:1).  The preparation and presentation of a ‘common position’ on the future of global drug 
policy, thus represents an internal success for the EU in this area.  This chapter will now go on to 
explore the ‘added value’ that the ‘common position’ has had on the UNGASS 2016 procedures and, 
by extension, on global drug policy debates in general.  
 
The common position: champions of change? 
 
On the 11th November, 2015, the EU’s common position (European Union, 2015) on UNGASS 2016 
was agreed as a summary of their contribution to discussions.  Broadly speaking, its central arguments 
surround the support of balanced and evidence-based drug policies, the importance of a public health 
and harm reduction approach, and the importance of respect for human rights and shared 
responsibility.  It also emphasised the need to involve civil society in drug policy debates, the 
importance of a commitment to alternative development, the value of the international drug control 
system in governing the scientific and medical use of drugs, the need to work towards sustainable 
development targets, and the need to address new facets of the illicit drug problem, such as 
clear/darknet markets and New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) (European Union, 2015).  In many 
ways, based on the content outlined above, this can be viewed as a progressive (or at least “politically 
correct” (Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, 2016:5)) document attesting to a balanced European approach and 
an appreciation of the major issues facing drug policy makers active on the global stage.  It also 
represents a significant step forward in terms of what European Member States have been able to 
agree on previously. 
 
As a first detailed example of internal progress, Europe has long been seen as an advocate of the 
principle of harm reduction within drug policy: the desire to reduce the harm that results from both 
drugs and drug policy rather than solely to focus on reducing the overall number of drug users (Lenton 
& Single, 1998).  The provision of substitution treatment to people who are dependent on heroin and 
services which offer clean needles to people who inject drugs are the most established and enduring 
harm reduction initiatives and several European countries were early adopters of these measures.  
The Netherlands, for example, adopted methadone maintenance in Amsterdam and a needle 
exchange programme in Rotterdam in the early 1980s (Marlatt, 1996).  Similar measures were 
adopted in the UK under Margaret Thatcher in an effort to reduce the sharing of needles, attract new 
people into service provision and increase the overall health of dependent drug users (O’Hare, 2007).  
Spurred on by the AIDS/HIV crisis of the 1980s, these measures were quickly adopted throughout 
much of Europe and beyond.  Today, every European Member State has some level of needle 
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exchange and substitution treatment provision within its borders (Rhodes & Hedrich, 2010).  To place 
this in a global context, 90 countries and territories (out of 158 reporting injecting drug use) now offer 
some form of needle exchange programme and 80 offer some form of opioid substitution treatment 
(Harm Reduction International, 2016). 
 
Many European countries have experimented with further, less well established, harm reduction 
measures: for example, the provision of heroin on prescription has been implemented in Germany, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland; drug-checking services are present in the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Austria; and drug consumption rooms are operating in the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
France, Luxembourg and Switzerland.  Yet, despite this long history of the early adoption of harm 
reduction measures and the fact that many European countries continue to be at the forefront of 
latest harm reduction developments, the European Union has faced an uphill struggle to advocate for 
harm reduction, even within its own borders.  This is partly because some European countries have 
been slow to fully adopt harm reduction practices into their national strategies.  Sweden, for example, 
only tolerated substitution treatment and needle exchange on a very minimal experimental basis for 
many years and Eastern European countries continue to offer very limited versions of these baseline 
harm reduction initiatives: in 2010 the 12 countries which joined the EU since 2004 only accounted 
for 2% of the substitution treatment available within Europe (EMCDDA, 2010) 
 
 
The EU’s relative impotence in this area can be demonstrated by referencing the 2004 Catania Report 
(ENCOD, 2004) which proposed a radical change in European drug policy based on a comprehensive 
failure to meet its principal aims (developed, of course, in line with UN aims and objectives) of 
eradicating or significantly reducing the use of drugs and attendant problems within its borders.  
Instead, a drug policy based around harm reduction, the application of scientific evidence, and a 
balanced approach encompassing public health as well as law enforcement and criminalisation was 
advocated (ENCOD, 2007).  The report was ostensibly approved by the European Parliament in 2004, 
but was immediately followed by a new European Drug Strategy and Action Plan in 2005 that made 
only minimal references to harm reduction due to a lack of consensus in this area and adhered to the 
familiar aims of eradicating or significantly reducing drug use. 
 
In more recent EU drug policy related documents, the principle of harm reduction has gained a 
stronger foothold.  There is still minimal reference to this principle in the overall Drug Strategy, but it 
achieves an increased presence in the detailed objectives of the Action Plans (Rhodes & Hedrich, 
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2010).  Given some member states’ (e.g. Sweden and, more recently, the UK) resistance to 
encouraging and supporting harm reduction measures, the strong promotion of harm reduction 
initiatives on the global stage, via the agreed European common position document, therefore 
represents a considerable step forward in EU positioning on drugs.  Within this document, harm 
reduction is mentioned both generally, as a guiding principle of global drug policy, and specifically in 
the call to increase the provision of substitution treatment throughout the world “as such measures 
have proved effective in reducing the number of direct and indirect drug related deaths and notably 
blood borne infectious diseases associated with drug use” (European Union, 2015:5).  Given the 
generally accepted effectiveness of substitution treatment, this can be viewed as a providing a 
potentially positive impact on the global stage. 
 
The promotion of a human rights agenda in relation to drug policy provides another example of an 
area where the EU can provide a positive global influence in the control of illicit substances.  This is an 
issue which has received increased global attention, particularly surrounding the unfairness of a global 
drug policy which concentrates all its efforts on reducing supply while neglecting to address demand, 
thus disadvantaging producer countries (Youngers & Roisin, 2005).  Pryce (2012:93) summarises the 
argument: “The unintended consequence of the belief that drugs are evil has been a less than 
scrupulous global attitude to human rights and liberties, an erosion of the values of the societies which 
prohibition is designed to protect”.   In this area, the application of the death penalty and the 
occurrence of extra-judicial killings have become focal points for global debate.  
 
Amnesty international (2011) has reported on the routine shooting of child cannabis farmers in Iran, 
Hope (2015) documents the 682 civilians who have been killed as a result of counter narcotics 
operations in Mexico since December 2012, and according to an investigation by the Philippines Daily 
Inquirer (2016) there were 1278 drug-related killings in the first 100 days of President Duterte’s 
government of the Philippines.  A report on the use of the death penalty for drug related offences 
found that there are at least 33 countries that prescribe the death penalty for drug-related offences, 
and at least 10 of these have the death penalty as a mandatory sanction (Gallahue & Lines, 2015).  The 
strongest message in the EU common position document thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, addresses this 
issue on which European agreement is not unexpected and designates the abolition of the death 
penalty, for all crimes including drug-related offences, as “an absolute priority” (European Union, 
2015:3).  
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It is important to remember that many argue, however, that human rights abuses are also prevalent 
within the control of illicit substances in consumer countries.  For example, a report produced for the 
Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme (Barrett et al, 2008) highlights: the arrest and ill treatment 
of drug users to meet drug reduction targets in Russia, Kazakhstan and the UK; detention and coercive 
treatment, sometimes including forced labour and moral education as in China; the denial of services 
to those who are imprisoned or to other vulnerable populations as in the UK and Europe; and the 
discriminatory application of drug control as seen in the US where African-American men are sent to 
prison at 13.4 times the rate of white men.  The EU common position document also makes an attempt 
to address some of these areas. 
 
For example, the common position document recommends “proportionality” (European Union, 
2015:4) in the punishment of those found guilty of drug offences, recognises that drug interventions 
and treatment in prisons need to be “substantially improved” (European Union, 2015:5), and draws 
attention to the “right of the drug user to give an informed consent to treatment” (European Union, 
2015:3).  The language used here, however, is less strong with the introduction of phrases such as ‘as 
appropriate’ and ‘except in exceptional circumstances’ attesting to the fact that agreement here, even 
among European Member States, is harder to secure.  In Sweden, for example, it has been possible to 
detain by force both youth and adult drug users who were not willing to take part in drug treatment 
voluntarily since the 1980s (Tops, 2001).  It could also be argued that Sweden’s practice of not 
separating, for example, cannabis from other drugs in terms of range and severity of punishments, 
and pursuing the users of drugs as well as the suppliers, as lacking in proportionality.  Again, significant 
progress can be seen in this area – the ability to agree a ‘common position’ has provided the EU with 
a strong vehicle for pushing human rights issues, like the death penalty, which are agreed upon 
throughout Europe.  An interesting contrast is provided by the weaker positioning on human rights 
abuses more likely to affect European countries. 
 
It is difficult to evaluate the precise nature of the impact that the EU common position on UNGASS 
2016 played in developing the final UNGASS Outcome document.  Fordham & Jelsma (2016:1) suggest 
the Outcome document has been “critical in shifting drug policy narrative towards public health, harm 
reduction and human rights”, and Nougier & Fernandez Ochoa (2017:1) similarly propose that it 
represents an unprecedented shift “towards ensuring public health, development and human rights 
concerns are not peripheral, but central to drug policy”.  The UNGASS positioning papers of many 
other global regions/bodies also mentioned these factors, but the ability of Europe to ‘speak with one 
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strong voice’ and champion these issues has undoubtedly played a part in ensuring their prominence 
in future global debates. 
 
 
The common position: defenders of the status quo? 
 
Thus far, the evidence suggests significant gains for Europe in the field of international drug policy 
influence, in terms of being able to speak with one voice and use that position to push forward some 
of the more liberal global drug policy ideas, in particular around public health, harm reduction and 
human rights.  This, however, is far from the whole story.  In the run up to UNGASS 2016, many 
commentators and experts imagined an “open and honest” (Ban Ki Moon, 2013:1) debate emerging 
on the failures of drug policy to date.  Furthermore, one area of particular focus promised to be the 
continuing suitability of existing international drug control conventions in light of recent systems of 
cannabis regulation in Uruguay and American States such as Colorado and Washington, which can be 
viewed as being in direct contravention of the terms of these treaties.   
 
The EU common position document is unequivocal in its support for the international conventions in 
their current form and entirely dismissive of any need for change in this central area of global drug 
control: “The three UN Drug Control Conventions, which provide the international legal framework 
for addressing the drugs phenomenon, and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are the 
cornerstones of the global response to the world drug problem … the EU and its Member States 
reiterate that the drug control treaties must be acknowledged and respected in developing and 
implementing national drug policies and laws” (European Union, 2015:2).  To further clarify the 
position, the common position goes on to say: “There is sufficient scope and flexibility within the 
provisions of the UN Conventions to accommodate a wide range of approaches to drug policy in 
accordance with national and regional specificities” (European Union, 2015:2).  This section will 
critically explore the consequences of maintaining this line. 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that this is the European view of the international conventions.  After all, 
this is a continent which has arguably long exploited the flexibility of the conventions.  Take, for 
example: the coffeeshop system facilitating the small-scale sale of cannabis in the Netherlands; the 
trend towards the decriminalisation of cannabis or all drugs for personal consumption epitomised by 
Portugal’s change in policy in 2001; the cannabis growing cooperatives that exploited a legal loophole 
in Spanish drug laws and have since spread throughout Europe.  As these examples attest, Europe has 
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indeed found considerable “room for manoeuvre” (Dorn & Jamieson, 2000) within the international 
conventions.  To be clear, the European position, correctly (Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, 2016), maintains 
that while these practices may push the boundaries of the treaties, they do not break them. 
 
There are two main problems with this approach.  Firstly, while the European ‘soft defections’ 
(Bewley-Taylor, 2012) may fall within the possible flexibility of the international conventions, the 
regulated markets practiced in Uruguay and some American States clearly do not.  In particular, the 
fully commercialised markets of, for example, Colorado or Washington State, fly in the face of 
international demands to treat illicit drugs as “a serious evil for the individual … fraught with social 
and economic danger” (United Nations, 1961:1).  By ignoring this problem, Europe (and indeed the 
UNGASS 2016 Outcome document) sidesteps this issue and allows a situation to continue whereby 
the international conventions are clearly being contravened.  Jelsma (2015) cautions that international 
agreements in other areas (for example, human rights) will ultimately be weakened if there are no 
consequences to contravening the international drug conventions. In this vein, it is interesting to note 
that countries such as the Russian Federation and China which practise strict national drug policies 
and which have faced accusations of drug-related human rights abuses, are also staunch supporters 
of the ability to interpret the existing conventions flexibly (Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, 2016), as this 
allows them to retain practices such as forced treatment or the death penalty. 
 
Furthermore, the issue may become significantly more pertinent to Europe in the near future. Public 
opinion surveys in the Netherlands have cited increasing levels of support for the full legalization of 
cannabis. In 2013, 65 percent of those surveyed reported that they would be in favour of introducing 
to the Netherlands the Uruguayan system whereby the production, sale, and consumption of cannabis 
were all legalized (Rolles, 2014).  Forty-one municipalities within the Netherlands have endorsed a 
manifesto proposing the regulation of cannabis production, and 25 of the 38 largest municipalities 
have applied to the Ministry of Justice for permission to experiment with various forms of authorised 
cannabis production and wholesale supply (Rolles, 2014).  Similarly, city officials in Copenhagen have 
made four applications to national government to implement a trial system of regulated cannabis 
sales administrated by the public authorities (Mortimer, 2016).    
 
In fact, the EU provides a good example of the limitations of drug-policy developments that take place 
within a flexible interpretation of the international conventions.  One example of these limitations is 
provided by the coffeeshop system in the Netherlands which represents a pragmatic attempt to 
separate the markets for cannabis and other drugs, while working within the UN conventions.  To this 
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end, the use, purchase and small-scale sale of cannabis is generally tolerated, and is primarily 
facilitated through the coffeeshop system.   A significant grey area inherent in this policy, however, is 
what Korf (2008) has termed the ‘back door’ issue.  While use, purchase and small-scale sale of 
cannabis may be tolerated, there exists no legal way for coffeeshops themselves to attain larger 
amounts of cannabis, because the production and commercial supply of cannabis is not tolerated.  
This places coffeeshops in a precarious semi-legal position whereby the front door sales of cannabis 
are regulated, but the backdoor supply of coffeeshops remains in the hands of criminals.  A recent 
review of the Netherlands’ separation of the markets policy concludes that: “If there is one lesson to 
take away from the Dutch experiences, it is that when taking steps towards regulating cannabis...these 
should include the entire chain of supply, from production to consumption” (Grund & Breeksema, 
2013:12).  The current coffeeshop ‘backdoor’ problem has been created largely because the Dutch 
tried to effect their relaxation of cannabis policy in accordance with the terms of the international 
conventions:  Room & Mackay (2012:7) therefore recognise that the international treaties have 
“blocked experimentation with regulated domestic drug markets”. 
 
Further limitations can be observed by a more general examination of decriminalisation.  Many 
countries in Europe now operate some form of decriminalisation (removal of or reduction in criminal 
penalties) of the possession of drugs for personal use.  However, in an effort to stay within the 
parameters of the UN conventions, they often retain some form of civil or minor criminal penalties 
against those behaviours (Room, 2012).  Room & Reuter (2012) report that, despite widespread 
decriminalisation efforts towards cannabis, the number of cannabis users coming into contact with 
the criminal justice system has actually increased, and attributes that finding to the fact that civil or 
more minor criminal penalties are actually easier to enforce.  As penalties are reduced they become 
more likely to be operationalised and, counter-intuitively, the result is a widening of the net (Room, 
et al, 2010) of those caught up in efforts to control the use of drugs – crucially, because countries are 
trying to work within UN conventions (Room & Reuter, 2012).   Bewley-Taylor (2013:61) therefore 
suggests that “working inside the confines of the UN treaty system and generating changes in rather 
than changes of regime actually sustains larger structures of harm”.   
 
These examples demonstrate that a flexible interpretation of international treaties does not address 
more radical instances of drug policy reform and limits the impact of softer drug-policy relaxation.  It 
is disappointing that the EU has not been able to push forward the debate on international treaty 
reform in this area, instead defending the status quo, despite the fact that drug policy innovation will 
continue to be restricted and some global national policies will continue to operate outside the terms 
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of the conventions.  One way in which the EU could have engendered improvement in this area would 
have been to support calls for an expert group to examine the options for reform of the global drug 
policy regime (Jelsma, 2015).  Such a move would have been in line with broad EU support for the 
development of evidence-based policy and would have provided a first step towards bringing the 
conventions in line with global practice.  Neither the EU ‘common position’ document nor the UNGASS 
2016 Outcome document, however, contain any reference to the creation of an ‘expert group’ 
charged with the further exploration of this issue. 
 
Another area on which the EU has been conspicuously silent is the failure of the war on drugs.  In some 
ways, the pressure for UNGASS 2016 can be seen as an indirect consequence of a rising global 
appreciation of the failure of ‘war on drugs’ strategies of drug control.  In the US, Obama’s 
administration moved away from war on drugs’ terminology and the Global Commission on Drug 
Policy, comprised of influential representatives from around the globe, was created in 2011 to call for 
a paradigm shift in drug policy towards drug policies that are both more effective and less harmful 
(Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2011).   Pryce (2012) documents the many failures of the war on 
drugs to end or significantly reduce the production, consumption and trade of illegal drugs, while at 
the same time noting the considerable negative ‘unintended consequences’ such policies have had on 
both producer and consumer countries.  A public recognition of these unintended consequences and 
their particular impact on drug producer countries by three Latin-American leaders (Fordham & 
Jelsma, 2016) contributed to the impetus for UNGASS 2016.  It is therefore a significant and important 
omission that the EU ‘common position’ does not make any mention of the failure of war on drugs 
and the need to move away from policies associated with it in favour of more progressive forms of 
prevention that focus on public health and human rights.   
 
Of course, even if the EU had acknowledged the failure of the war on drugs, it is unlikely this would 
have been adopted in the final UNGASS Outcome document as there are still plenty of global 
supporters of war on drugs style policies: Russia for example has promised to renew the commitment 
to fighting the war on drugs as part of UNGASS 2016 discussion (Fordham, 2016).   This omission, 
however, together with continuing support for unrealistic and over-zealous aims of ‘a world free of 
drug abuse’ and the adoption of cautious language such as ‘as appropriate’ and ‘in accordance with 
national legislation’ around more progressive points, has considerably weakened the EU’s position as 
advocates for the development of a more effective global drug policy.  In combination with 
unwavering support for the treaties as they stand, it provides evidence that the EU is unable to think 
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outside the existing drug policy control toolbox (Seddon, 2014) and advocate for meaningful change 




Conclusion: an evaluation of EU contributions to global drug policy debates 
 
The UNGASS 2016 Outcome document has met with mixed approval with some lauding it as a 
progressive move towards public health, harm reduction and development (Fernandez Ochoa & 
Nougier, 2017), while others feel it has proved a missed opportunity to overhaul and modernise the 
global drug control system (Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2016).  From an EU viewpoint, the 
result of UNGASS 2016 has been largely positive.  EU contributions to Commission for Narcotic Drugs 
(CND) meetings since UNGASS 2016 confirm strong support for the outcome document which they 
describe as “the greatest milestone in the international drugs policy development” (European Union, 
2017a:1) and which, as previously mentioned, they feel is a good reflection of European drug policy in 
general (European Commission, 2017b:27).  External evaluations of EU drug policy have also suggested 
that the EU should now seek to “build on the momentum from the successful negotiation at UNGASS 
… in order to exert greater European influence on shared concerns in the area of the drug 
phenomenon” (RAND, 2017:16).  
 
To some extent this has been the case.  As preparations get underway for the next High Level 
Ministerial meeting on international drug control in 2019 there have been several opportunities.  At 
the 60th Session of the CND in March 2017, the EU continued to push for the abolition of the death 
penalty and the greater contribution of civil society to ongoing debates (European Union, 2017a); at 
the intercessional meeting in November 2017 it sought to “further strengthen the link between the 
UNGASS recommendations and drug related Sustainable Development Goals” (European Union, 
2017b:2); and in October 2016 it committed to considerable funding to aid the Community of Latin 
America and Caribbean States (CELAC) achieve sustainability development targets (European 
Commission, 2016) .  The European Commission (2017a) evaluation of EU drug policy also attests to 
the intention to make internal changes to EU drug policy based on the UNGASS 2016 Outcome 
document.  For example, it recommends that the three pillars underlying the EU drug strategy, based 
around demand reduction, supply reduction and international cooperation, should be aligned instead 
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to the seven-pillar approach raised at UNGASS which, for example, divides demand reduction into 
prevention and treatment, and availability and access for medical and scientific purposes. 
 
The successful negotiation of a common European position which pursues a public health, sustainable 
development, evidence based and human rights oriented approach, under a flexible interpretation of 
the current treaties, is a significant achievement for the membership of the European Union.  It aligns 
with their goals to increase coordination and cooperation between Member States and to ‘speak with 
one voice’ on the global stage.  A flexible interpretation of existing conventions allows them to justify 
the varied innovative policy strategies within their borders without becoming embroiled in 
contentious debates about the need for treaty reform (Bewley-Taylor, 2013).   It fits with their 
experience of the ‘added value’ of multi-levels of governance in which international, national and local 
governing bodies all have an important part to play in the implementation of effective policy.  The 
Outcome document generally aligns with the EU position (although not in some key areas such as the 
elimination of the death penalty) reflecting the potential impact of its contribution.  Its adoption will 
require little change within the borders of the EU other than some minor tweaks to the structure of 
drugs policy.   
 
The exact purpose of the UN High Level Mnisterial meeting in 2019, following so close on the heels of 
UNGASS 2016, remains to be precisely determined.  Another international drug control meeting is 
needed because the current Political Declaration and Plan of Action were not reviewed at UNGASS 
2016 and are due to expire.  Part of the mandate of recent CND meetings has been to decide the aims 
of this meeting – should it, for example, be an honest evaluation of the effectiveness of global drug 
control in general and the 2016 Outcome document in particular, a lively debate after a period of 
reflection on the outcomes of 2016, an opportunity to negotiate a new outcome document, or a 
chance to focus on providing a practical roadmap to implementing the Outcome document 
(International Drug Policy Consortium, 2016)?  At the most recent CND meeting, the EU has been clear 
on its own position on this matter: “Efforts should be focused on implementing commitments made 
during the UNGASS in 2016.  We should not negotiate a new political document” (European Union, 
2017b:3).  It seems clear that the result of UNGASS 2016 was a resounding success in terms of 
European drug policy.  While the EU can continue to push single issues, such as the death penalty, at 
international fora, they are ultimately happy with the status quo of an international drug policy that 
continues to strive for a drug free world, that views the last 40 years of international drug policy as a 
tangible success and which continues to be framed by existing international drug conventions. 
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For many, Europe is a continent already associated with drug policy experimentation and innovation 
giving rise to interventions such as Dutch coffeeshops, Spanish cannabis clubs and Portuguese 
decriminalisation.  We should not, however, be surprised at this failure to ‘champion change’ in 
international drug policy discussions.  For a start, “European countries have not experienced to the 
same extent, the high human cost in terms of violence, insecurity and mass incarceration experienced 
in Latin America” (Fordham & Jelsma, 2016:1).  Furthermore, illegal drugs can be viewed as a complex 
policy problem existing in a state of flux (Mulgan, 2004), bound up with moral values and susceptible 
to emotional responses (Ritter, 2009).  Available evidence thus remains open to interpretation, 
particularly given that there are no commonly agreed upon indicators of success in drug policy.  Pryce 
(2012) lists many disincentives to advocating for significant policy change in a complex field such as 
that of drugs – ideological beliefs that drugs are morally reprehensible, fear of the unknowns of 
alternative systems, the political difficulties of challenging the global status quo, bureaucratic inertia 
inspired by the enormity of changing international agreements, and the vested interests of whole 
industries that have sprung up around drug treatment and enforcement agencies.   
 
For the EU, perhaps the greatest of these obstacles relates to the political difficulties of challenging 
the status quo.  In an exploration of the continuation of a ‘war on drugs’ approach under the Obama 
regime, despite official indications that it was to be abandoned as a term, Youngers (2011:341), 
concludes that a ‘tough on drugs’ approach is popular with constituents and encourages leaders to 
play “on public fears, turning a public health issue into an all-out war on addictive substances and 
those who supply them”.  Telling people what really needs to be done in terms of the alleviation of 
poverty, the treatment of addicts, and the nurturing of global regions that are susceptible to drug 
trade related corruption, is a strategy much less likely to win support and would require courageous 
leadership indeed (Isacson, 2005).  Furthermore, given the fear associated with the unknown 
outcomes of any relaxation of the global drug policy regime, to take even the first step towards such 
a position could be politically problematic (Reuter, 2011).  Finally, with 30 years of international drug 
policy making under its belt, the EU is well placed to understand the difficulties in engendering 
international agreement in this area.  
 
While we continue to cling to the illusion that we are making progress towards an ultimate aim of a 
drug free world, without acknowledging the manifold and significant unintended consequences of the 
existing system of global drug control, which often impact disproportionately on vulnerable regions of 
the world, we cannot see real progress in global drug policy, and we will continue to suffer from its 
unintended effects.  If the EU really wants to see a more progressive global drug policy, first steps 
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must be to acknowledge existing failures and associated harms, and to lobby to ensure that existing 
legislation does not stand in the way of the development of innovative and experimental policies, such 
as cannabis regulation.   It is difficult to imagine how we could move forward in terms of drug policy, 
towards more effective context appropriate strategies, if we do not or cannot innovate.  Ultimately, 
the EU’s performance on the global stage of drug policy thus remains hampered by its failure to engage 
with the continuing suitability of the existing systems of international drug control.   
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